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Supreme Court No. 15277 
In the above-captioned case the trial transcript constitutes part 
of the record. However, this transcript is very confusing since it was not 
properly dated or arranged by the district court reporters. Therefore, the 
purpose of this letter is to alleviate potential :;onfusion which might result 
as you read through the transcript. 
This case actually came on for trial on the 14th and 17th days of 
January, 1977 and on the llth day of February, 1977. Thus, the title page 
of that portion of the transcript bound in the red binder is incorrect and mis-
leading. Pages l thru 73 of the red binder actually contain the transcript 
for the first day of trial, January 14th. A transcript of the next day of trial, 
January 17th, is contained in the green binder. Finally, the transcript for 
the third and final day of trial, February 11, 1977, is contained in pages 74 
thru 102 of the red binder. 
Thus, in order to read the transcript of this case in its proper 
ehronolog ical order, pages l thru 73 of the red trial transcript should first be 
read, then pages l thru 73 of the green trial transcript should be read and 
finally pages 74 Lhru 102 of the red trial transcript should be read. 
Since there were two reporters involved in making up the transcript 
and since these reporters did not number the pages consecutively; defendant-
appellant in his brief has indicated which trial transcript--red or green-- he 
is quoting from or using as authority. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Honorilblc ]usticc:s 
DcccmbcrlG, 1977 
Pugc Two 
Although the trial transcripts are not properly arranged, they do appear 
to be complete in all respects. 
Very truly yours, 
STRONG & HANNI 
RAB:lge 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROCHELLE RITCHIE WILSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ROBERT GAINES WILSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No: 15277 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a divorce action. Defendant-appellant 
does not contest the Decree of Divorce itself. However, he is contesting 
the property division and alimony award ordered by the Trial Court. Defendant 
maintains that the property awarded plaintiff-respondent, his former wife, was 
excessive in amount and was not warranted by the evidence; furthermore, the 
permanent alimony award to plaintiff of $900.00 per month was excessive 
both in amount and duration. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 2 7, 1969, plaintiff and defendant were married in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. This was a second marriage for both persons. Defendant had 
two sons by his previous marriage, both of whom presently reside in North 
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Carolina with their mother. Defendant is obligated to pay $500.00 per 
month in child support for the maintenance of these two boys. 1 In addition 
he is obligated to maintain a $20,000.00 life insurance policy on his life 
with his two sons as joint beneficiaries; maintain health insurance on both 
sons; provide funds for all education that either son may need or desire 
beyond high school to and including graduate and professional schools. 2 
Plaintiff also had two children, a son and a daughter by a previous 
marriage. The ages of these children were twelve and ten, respectively, 
when plaintiff and defendant were married. The daughter, Kelly, resided 
with plaintiff and defendant during almost the entire course of their 
marriage. Trey, the son, lived for over a year with the parties. Defendant 
provided the sole support for these children during this period with the 
exception of $50.00 per month which each child received as child support 
3 from plaintiff's former husband. Defendant was a generous provider. 
Besides giving each child complete medical and dental care and a private 
room, bath and furniture, he provided, among other things, the following: 
bicycles, stereos, ski equipment, numerous trips, private dancing lessons, 
1 Green TR. 40. p. 
2 Green TR. 41. p. 
3 Red TR. p. 49. 
-2-
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private diving lessons, ski lessons, private tutors, psychological testing. 4 
When the parties were married, plaintiff did not bring any assets into 
the marriage excepting a few household items - pots, pans, some dishes and 
silver, sewing machine, washer and dryer. 5 On the other hand, defendant 
contributed substantial assets to the marriage. These assets included the 
following: 1969 automobile with a value of $3,500.00, 6 down payment on a 
7 home in the sum of $15,000.00. (When the house was sold, defendant's 
$15,000.00 was then used to partially finance the purchase of the condominium 
in which the parties then resided); four monthly payments on the parties' 
home totaling $2,000.00. 8 (This money was also subsequently invested 
in the condominium). Office equipment valued at $2,000.00. 9 
Although prior to the parties' marriage, plaintiff had been employed 
as a doctor's assistant and as a licensed expert technician, 10she never 
worked during the marriage despite the fact that defendant had encouraged 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Green TR. pp. 39-40. 
Red TR. p. 50. 
Green TR. p. 28. 
Defendant's testimony at trial was that he had made a down payment of 
approximately $10,000.00. (Green TR. p. 28) However, Exhibit "A" to 
defendant's Memorandum of Law establishes that defendant actually paid 
in excess of $15,000.00 for this down payment. (R. p. 91) 
Green TR. p. 29. 
GreenTR. p. 48. 
Red TR. p. 48. 
-3-
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her to do so on numerous occasions. For example, defendant testified as 
follows: 
"Q. Did she work at all during the marriage? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you have any discussions with her about working? 
"A. Yes ... On many occasions we discussed the 
possibility of her working. She did not have enough 
to occupy her time. Was always wondering what to do 
with her time and I suggested she regain herself as an 
x-ray technician and when she rejected that idea, I 
asked if she would like to be employed as a pottery 
helper or art instructor or feeling that she could help 
me in the office part time. All of these discussions 
were held in an on-going manner throughout the marriage. 
"Q. And did she endeavor to do any of these? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did she ever say why? 
"A. No, she just didn't want to. "11 
Plaintiff contributed absolutely nothing of a monetary nature to the accrual 
of the estate of plaintiff and defendant. 
During the course of their marriage defendant worked unceasingly. 
Through his diligent efforts he was able to accumulate the property which 
forms part of the subject matter of this appeal. 
On APril 1 , 1976, approximately six years and seven months after 
the marriage of Dr. and Mrs. Wilson, Mrs. Wilson filed her complaint 
11 Green TR. pp. 32-33. 
-4-
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seeking a divorce, alimony of $1,000.00 per month, and an equal division 
of all real and personal property which r::r. Wilson brought into the marriage 
and which he was able to accumulate during the tenure of the marriage. 12 
She did not seek child support since no children were ever born to the 
plaintiff and defendant. 
From the date of the filing of this action until after the trial court 
rendered judgment in May of 1977, defendant paid plaintiff the following 
amounts: $1,200.00 cash; $1 ,000. 00 which he left in the checking account; 
all household bills; an airline ticket to North Carolina worth $286. 00; $400.00 
in psychiatric bills for plaintiff; $250.00 cash. 13 In addition defendant 
paid plaintiff $6,200.00 so she could purchase a new automobile; he paid 
her temporary alimony at $650.00 per month since June of 1976 for a total 
14 
sum of $7,800 .00; and he allowed her exclusive occupancy of the condominium. 
While defendant was making the aforementioned payments, he resided 
alone in a small apartment. 
On January 14, 17 and February 11, this case came on for trial 
before the HonorableG. Hal Taylor. After the trial had concluded the court 
granted plaintiff a divorce and announced a property distribution. The property 
12 
13 
14 
R. p. 2. 
Plaintiff has not disputed that these payments were made. They are 
summarized in defendant's Affidavit to the trial court. (R. p. 17) 
Trial court's Order of Temporary Support. (R. pp. 25-26) 
-5-
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was distributed as listed below. As might be expected in a case of this 
nature, conflicting evidence was offered as to the value of the respective 
items of property. For purposes of this brief, defendant is giving plaintiff 
the benefit of the doubt and is accepting her valuations for most of the property 
listed below. Documentation and explanation of these values can be found ln 
the footnotes. 
PROPERTY AWARDED PLAINTIFF VALUE 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
E. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Condominium at 6066 South 1480 East, 
$ 80,000.oo15 Salt Lake City, Utah 
Three lots in North Carolina 12,000.0016 
Plaintiff's automobile 6,200.oo17 
Diamond ring 6,ooo.oo18 
Stoneware 400.oo19 
RedTr. p. 37, P. Ex. 15, D. Ex. 21. This condominium was described 
at trial as follows: 
"It is a 2-story condominium in Village Three. It has approximately 
3100 square feet, out garage and patio. It has upstairs; a living 
room, dining room, kitchen with bar, large master bedroom, private 
bath and closet, a second full bath upstairs, study, a laundry room. 
And downstairs is a large finished bedroom with private bath and 
closet, another finished bedroom and a medium-size family room, 
plus a large workshop area, semi-finished." 
P. Ex. 15. 
R. p. 25. 
D. Ex. 19. 
P. Ex. 13. 
-6-
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F. 
G. 
H. 
Furniture in condominium with the exception of 
the items specifically awarded to the defendant 
Personal items 
$2,000.00 from defendant's 1976 income tax refund 
6,896.00 20 
21 None 
2,ooo.oo22 
PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT VALUE 
$100,000.0023 
30,ooo.oo24 
15,636.7325 
A. 
B. 
c. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Interest in profit sharing trust 
Partnership interest 
Interest in professional corporation 
Red TR. p. 71, P. Ex. 14. Plaintiff's attorney agreed that plaintiff had 
valued the personal property in the condominium at $8,316.00. From this 
figure $1,420.00 was subtracted since defendant was awarded personal 
property which plaintiff herself had valued at $1,420.00. Presumably the 
$6,896.00 figure included the value of the man's chest and the corner table 
which were awarded plaintiff and which were specified separately in the 
divorce decree. (R. p. 130) 
There was no testimony as to the value of these items and said items 
were not specified. 
Absolutely no evidence was introduced at trial to warrant the award of 
this sum to plaintiff. 
Red TR. p. 2 9, wherein it was stated that defendant's interest in the 
trust was 80% of$12 5, 000.00. Defendant, however, disputes this 
valuation as will be discussed below. 
P. Ex. 10 through 12 and Red TR. p. 28. 
Plaintiff's Ex. 9, Red TR. p. 11. This $15,636.73 figure includes the 
value of defendant's automobile, filing drawer and desk, naugahyde 
stool, lamp, suecechairs, bookcase, etagere. See P. Ex. 9 and Red 
TR. pp. 21, 59, 61, 63. 
-7-
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D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
I. 
J. 
K. 
L. 
M. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Cattle $ 6120o.oo 26 
Rocks and equipment 101635.0027 
Ranch in North Carolina 10iooo.oo28 
Cottonwood Country Club membership 11ooo.oo29 
Beach Mountain lot None 30 
Trailer 700.oo31 
Sheep horns None 32 
Fish trap tables 2o.oo33 
Bronze goblets 1 plates and flatware 127.0034 
Money in bank accounts 21531.92 35 
Red TR. pp. 72 1 73. 
Defendant disputes this valuation. In plaintiff's opinion the rocks 
and equipment are worth $2 1960.00. See D. Ex. 21. 
P. Ex. 15. Defendant valued his interest in this ranch at $3 1 000.00. 
See D. Ex. 21. 
R. p. 92. Red TR. p. 75. 
Neither party offered any evidence as to the value of plaintiff's equity 
in this lot. SeeP. Ex. 15 1 D. Ex. 21. 
D. Ex. 21. 
No evidence was offered by either party as to the value of these horns. 
P. Ex. 14. 
P. Ex. 13. 
Plaintiff listed the value of defendant's bank accounts at $28, 531.92. 
However, from this figure must be subtracted the $20,000.00 which 
defendant was required to repay his father's estate. Green TR. pp. 25, 
26. (And the $6,000.00 which he placed in an educational trust fund for 
the benefit of his two sons by the former marriage) Green TR. p. 41. 
-8-
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N. 
o. 
1976 tax refund except $2,000. 00 which was paid 
plaintiff 
Personal items 
$ 9,399.oo 36 
None37 
When the foregoing figures are added up they show that plaintiff 
received property with a value of $104,600.00. Defendant received property 
of a total value of $176,850.65, if one considers the value of his profit 
sharing trust at a full $100,000.00 and if the 1976 tax refund is also 
included. 3 8 
As stated, plaintiff also received the sum of $17,136.00 from 
defendant prior to the entry of the final divorce decree on May 6, 1977. 
When this figure, minus the $6,200.00 which she spent for her new automobile, 
is added to the monetary value of plaintiff's property settlement, it is 
apparent that at the time the divorce was granted, plaintiff had received 
property and payments totaling the sum of $115,536.00. 
36 
37 
38 
Defendant maintains that this refund should not be considered as a 
portion of the marital estate since absolutely no evidence was offered 
concerning it at trial. The only reference at all concerning it occurred 
in an Addendum to Plaintiff's Memorandum to the Trial Court submitted 
almost two months after the trial had concluded, (R. p. 120) 
No evidence whatsoever was offered concerning what these items 
consisted of or their value. 
Defendant maintains that the trust fund should have been valued at 
most at $50,000.00 and that the 1976 tax refund should not have been 
considered as part of the marital estate by either party. Taking these 
factors into account, the total value of defendant's property distribution 
is $117,451.65. 
-9-
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·-
This was not all that plaintiff was granted by the trial court. She 
was also awarded attorney's fees in the sum of $6,000.00. In addition, she 
received a permanent award of alimony in the sum of $900.00 per month. At 
the date of the trial plaintiff was 40 years old. If one assumes that she draws 
alimony at the present rate until she is 65 years of age, her total alimony 
award would be in excess of $270,000.00. 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE 
AND TO CORRECT ANY INEQUITIES RESULTING FROM THE 
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has often expressed the thought recently 
articulated in the following dicta from Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697 (Utah 
1974) wherein the court stated: 
"Although it is both the duty and prerogative 
of this court in a case of equity to review the facts 
as well as the law, Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution 
of Utah, the trial judge has considerable latitude of 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests 
in a divorce case. " 
See also, Tsoufakis v. Tsoufckis, 14 Utah 2d 2 73, 382 P. 2d 412 (196! 
wherein the Utah court stated: 
"Although a divorce case is equitable in nature, and this court 
will review the evidence and may substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court under proper circumstances, it will not 
disturb a trial court's judgment in the division of property or 
awards of alimony and child support unless it appears to be 
unjust and inequitable and therefore an abuse of discretion. 
Whether the awards of the division of property is unjust or inequitable 
-10-
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must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances in 
each particular case." 
However, a review of Utah cases decided within the last forty years 
indicates the Utah court not only carefully reviews the evidence but it also 
often substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court in alimony and 
property distribution matters. A partial listing of authorities reads as 
follows: Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973) (Court 
disallows alimony award of $375.00 per month); Martinett v. Martinett, 
8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958) (Supreme Court reduces an excessive 
property award which the trial court granted plaintiff); Dehm v. Dehm, 545 
P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) (Supreme Court reduces wife's alimony from $300.00 
per month to $1 . 00 per month); Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 16 6 P. 2d 
516 (1946) (Supreme Court reduces alimony award from $40.00 per month 
for two years to $40.00 per month for six months); Hampton v. Hampton, 
80 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419 (1935) (Supreme Court reduces award of alimony 
which trial court granted wife from $54.00 per month to $45.00 per month); 
Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 25 7, 53 P. 2d 428 (1936) (Supreme Court reduces 
an excessive alimony award to a lump sum of $1,500. 00); Graziano v. Graziano, 
7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931 (1958) (Decree granting wife a divorce was 
modified by striking award of alimony and attorney's fees); Wilson v. Wilson, 
5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 997 (1956) (Supreme Court reduced defendant's 
$100.00 month payment period for alimony to forty-eight months); Felt v. Felt, 
-11-
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27 Utah 2d 130, 493 P.2d 620 (1972} (Supreme Court remanded the case 
for a new trial in order for the trial court to evaluate circumstances which 
might merit a reduction in alimony). 
Numerous other Utah cases could be cited in which the Supreme 
Court held that circumstances warranted a modification of the trial court's 
award of property and alimony. In the present case those same circumstances 
exist and the trial court's decree should be modified. 
POINT II. 
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS IMPROPER, HIGHLY INEQUITABLE TO THE DEFENDANT 
AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DISCRETION. 
A. Total value of property award was clearly excessive. 
The Utah Supreme Court still endorses Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 
67 P.2d 265 and_McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 as 
establishing the guidelines to which the trial court should look when making 
property distribution awards in divorce cases. Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 
P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977). 
In McDonald v. McDonald, Supra, Chief Justice Crockett prefaces 
his remarks concerning the relevant factors which the trial court should 
consider by stating: 
"During the writer's experience as a trial judge the opinion 
of Chief Justice Woolf in the case of Pinion v. Pinion, supra, 
was found helpful. Based on that pattern the following was 
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devised as a general formula for attempting to get all of the 
factors together in perspective and compare and evaluate 
them in adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties. 
All may not be present or important in every case but we apply 
them to the evidence herein. " 
After this introduction, Justice Crockett stated the relevant factors 
as follows: 
"(1) the social position and standard of living of each 
before marriage . . . 
"(2) the respective ages of each of the parties 
"(3) what each may have given up for the marriage 
"(4) what money or property each brought into the marriage 
"(5) the physical and mental health of the parties .•. 
"(6) the relative ability, training and education of the parties 
"(7) the time and duration of the marriage . . . 
"(8) the present income of the parties and the property 
acquired during marriage and owned either jointly or by 
each now ... 
"(9) how it was acquired and the efforts of each in doing so ••• 
"(10) children reared, their present ages, and obligations to them 
or help which may in some instances be expected •.. 
"(11) the present mental and physical health of the parties 
"(12) the present age and life expectancy of the parties •• 
"(13) the happiness and pleasure or lack of it, experienced 
during marriage . . . 
"(14) any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care which may 
-13-
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have been given to the spouse or others, such as mother, 
father, etc. , and obligations to other dependents having 
a secondary right to support ... 
"(15) the present standard of living and needs of each including 
the cost of living . . • " 
A careful juxtaposition of the facts and circumstances of the instant 
against the fifteen factors above enumerated clearly shows that Mrs. Wilson 
property award of $115,536.00 was excessive in amount. For example, in 
relation to Factor No. 4, she has not brought any significant property into th 
marriage whereas the defendant brought into the marriage assets with a valuE 
exceeding $20,000.00. 39 
In relation to Factors 8 and 9, it must be noted that the property now 
) held was all acquired solely through the efforts of defendant. Although 
defendant repeatedly suggested that plaintiff obtain some sort of part-time 
job, plaintiff refused to do so. 40 
With respect to Factor No. 10, it is important that no children were 
born to Dr. and Mrs. Wilson and the children of Mrs. Wilson by her first 
marriage are now both old enough to make a significant contribution to their 
own support and maintenance. 
Factors 5 and 6 must also be evaluated. Plaintiff is in good health 
and as testiff.ed to at trial is capable of earning at least $750.00 a month as 
a doctor's licensed technician. 41 
39 
40 
41 
Id. Notes 5-9. 
Id. Note 11. 
Red TR. pp. 30-33. 
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In the instant case, Factor No. 7 is perhaps the most important factor 
to consider. Plaintiff and defendant were married but six years and seven 
months when this divorce action was brought. The duration of this marriage 
was simply too short to support such a huge property award as that granted 
by the trial court. 
After diligent search, defendant has only been able to find three Utah 
divorce cases in which a property distribution was contested and in which the 
wife was awarded property valued in excess of the property awarded plaintiff 
42 in the instant case. In each one of those three cases, compelling 
circumstances not present here justified such an award. For example, in 
Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697 (Utah 197 4) plaintiff got property valued at 
$205,150.00. However, the court accented the facts that the parties had 
been married over twenty-seven years and that plaintiff received absolutely 
no alimony. 
In Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973), the court 
gave plaintiff sixty per cent of an estate valued at $588,581.00. However, 
the Supreme Court disallowed the $375.00 alimony award decreed by the 
trial court. Moreover, the court emphasized the fact that the parties had 
been married for thirty years and that almost all of the assets which defendant 
had invested to build his estate came from his plaintiff-wife. 
42 In Kline v. Kline, 5 44 P. 2d 4 72 (Utah 1975), the parties stipulated that a 
$1,748,809.98 estate should be divided so that the husband received 
$931 , 602.63 and the wife received $7 43,387. 35. This property division 
stipulation was approved on appeal. 
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InWeaverv. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166,442 P.2d 928, the plaintiff-wifE 
was awarded property valued at $375,000.00. However, she received no 
alimony and was required to pay her own attorney's fees. Moreover, again 
the court accented the fact that the parties had been married over thirty years 
and that the wife had worked extensively during the early years of the marriage 
to provide for her and her husband. The court also emphasized the fact that 
at the time of the divorce the wife was an invalid unable to work. 
B. Plaintiff's award of $2,000.00 on defendant's 1976 tax refund finds 
absolutely no support in the evidence. 
There was absolutely no evidence whatsoever submitted during the trial 
which would suggest or even intimate that plaintiff should be awarded this 
$2,000.00 sum. Apparently, on or about April 5, 1977,- almost two months 
after the trial in this case had concluded - plaintiff's attorney obtained a copy 
of defendant's 1976 income tax return which was submitted to him for his client 
signature. Plaintiff's counsel then filed a Memorandum with the trial court, 
attached the first page of defendant's tax return to that Memorandum and reque: 
that the future tax refund be considered by the court in dividing the marital esti 
43 
Without any oral argument and more importantly without a shred of ev!CI 
See Addendum to plaintiff's April 5, 1977, Memorandum to the trial 
court. (R. p. 120) 
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or testimony being offered at trial, the District Judge awarded plaintiff $2,000.00 
of this refund based solely on the request made in plaintiff's Memorandum. 
C. Defendant's trust fund was not properly valued and resulted in an 
inflated value being placed on his entire share of the estate. 
The trial court should not have considered defendant's interest in the 
trust fund as being worth $100,000.00 since the funds could not presently be 
withdrawn without destroying the plan. 
Even if the funds could be withdrawn and the trust terminated on the day 
of plaintiff's divorce or at present, the following would result: The $100,000.00 
in the pension trust would be considered income to Dr. Wilson for the year in 
which the trust was terminated. This $100,000.00 together with defendant's 
annual salary and other income of approximately $100,000.00 would make a 
$200,000.00 taxable income for the year involved. On the basis of Schedule 
Y, the applicable tax rate schedule for 1976, the taxes on $200,000.00 would 
be $125,490.00. One-half of this would be applicable to the pension trust 
income. This would amount to $62,745.00, leaving a net of $37,255.00 from 
the $100,000. 00. Of course, defendant would probably have certain deductions 
which he could claim to reduce the tax somewhat, but it is clear that he 
would still be required to pay at least $50,000.00 in taxes on the $100,000.00 
from the trust fund. 
It is hornbook law that tax consequences must be taken into account 
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in any divorce property settlement award. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.y. 340, 331 A.ZC 
257; Kulav. Kula, 181 Neb. 531, 149 N.W.2d 430 (1967). Therefore, takingt~ 
above into account and subtracting from defendant's total property award the sum 
of $50,000.00 attributable to the trust fund and $9,399.00 attributable to the 19i 
tax refund it is apparent that defendant's property award was actually worth 
I 
$117, 451. 6 5 , where as plaintiff's property award was $115, 53 6 . 00 . Considering( 
all of the Pinion, Supra, and McDonald,~ factors above discussed, 
plaintiff's huge property settlement award constituted a blatant inequity to 
defendant. 
D. Defendant's suggested remedy of inequitable property distribution. 
Defendant recognizes that a number of items of personal and real 
property were distributed to the respective parties. An evaluation of the 
propriety of each separate conveyance of property would be an unduly burden-
some and laborious task which this court should not be called upon to perform. 
Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that plaintiff be required to sell 
the condominium and divide the proceeds with deferrlant. Not only would 
this solution be the easiest for the court to work with, but it would also be 
best for plaintiff's interests. 
The $80,000.00 condominium which consists of 3,100 square feet is 
far too large for plaintiff's needs or even her 'reasonable" desires. With her 
share of the proceeds from the sale of the condominium she could purchase 
outright a smaller, yet very fashionable, and progressive home, apartment or 
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condominium which would better befit her life style. Her living expenses would 
then be reduced since she would not be required to light, heat, care for and 
maintain such an unduly large residence. 
Defendant would also benefit since any decrease in plaintiff's living 
expenses should result in a concomitant decrease in his alimony payments. 
He would, of course, also be entitled to part of the proceeds from the sale of 
the condominium. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD OF $900.00 PER MONTH 
WAS HIGHLY INEQUITABLE TO DEFENDA..l\J'T AND CONSTITUTED AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The award of alimony granted plaintiff is far higher than any other 
reported award of alimony ever approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Furthermore, 
the permanence of the award makes it especially egregious to defendant. 
It is clear from the McDonald and Pinion decisions that the same 
factors governing property settlements also govern the award of alimony. 
The same arguments made under Point II with respect to the inequity of the 
property distribution are also fully applicable in the alimony context. However, 
when an award of alimony is bei ng contemplated as contrasted with a property 
distrubtion, two factors stand out as being of paramount importance. One, 
the needs of the spouse to whom alimony will be awarded. Carter v. Carter, 
563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977); Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Barrett 
v. Barrett, 17 Utah 2d 1, 403 P.2d 649 (1965); Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 
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504, 229 P.2d 681 {1951). Two, the duration of the marriage. Frank v. Frank, 
18 Utah 2d 228, 419 P.2d 199 (1966); Barrett v. Barrett, Supra; Anderson v. I 
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 {1943); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 
67 P.2d 265 (1937); Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P.2d 428 {1936). 
A. Needs of Spouse. 
Barrett v. Barrett, Supra, deals with a remarkably similar fact situation 
and forcefully illustrates that a wife's alimony should not be greater than her 
needs. In this case, the trial court granted the plaintiff-wife a divorce and 
awarded her $250.00 in monthly alimony payments, $200.00 in child support 
payments, and a $15,000.00 property settlement. However, the court required 
her to reconvey to defendant a diamong ring worth $9,500.00 which her defendc: 
husband had purchased for her. Although the defendant-husband had a net 
worth of $1 ,200,000.00, the Supreme Court limited the alimony obligations 
imposed upon him and made the following pertinent observations: 
"The custody of the daughter Michele, now three years 
of age, is of course properly with the plaintiff and the 
$200.00 per month is a suitable award for her support.-.. 
In view of the defendant's comparative affluence the property 
settlement of $15,000.00 is likewise appropriate; and there 
no particular reason to disagree with the return of the 
$9,500.00 diamond ring. However, the award of $250.00 
per month alimony on an indefinite basis we believe is not 
justified. This was a misadventure in marriage for both 
parties and was of comparatively short duration. The 
plaintiff is a young woman with a life expectancy of over 
thirty years so that award could amount to many thousands 
of dollars. It is true that she does have the responsibility 
of being a mother to Michele. Yet she had been married before 
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and has other children. The actual care and support of Michele 
is presumably compensated for by the $200.00 per month. 
Further, it should not be assumed that the plaintiff is or will 
remain helpless. She held a responsible position prior to this 
marriage. It is our opinion that under all of the circumstances 
shown equity and justice will be served by placing some 
reasonable limitation upon the award of alimony and that after 
a period of two years it should cease." 
The Barrett decision and the other foregoing cases all require that this 
court carefully evaluate the needs of plaintiff. In doing so, the following should 
be kept in mind: 
In July of 1976 plaintiff submitted a list of her monthly expenses to 
Judge Conder in a prior hearing in this case. The total of those monthly 
expenses as she itemized them on that list came to $598.00. 44 However, 
just a few months later when the trial of this case actually commenced, 
plaintiff submitted a new itemization of her monthly expenses. 45 On this 
list plaintiff claimed her monthly expenses were $842.00. Obviously, there 
is a $244.00 per month discrepancy between plaintiff's two evaluations of her 
necessary monthly expenses. 
There can be no question but that plaintiff's second itemization 
(Ex. No. 16) is grossly inflated. For example, she valued her monthly 
telephone bill at $45.00, when she testified that her flat rate was merely 
46 $13.50 per month. She itemized her Mountain Fuel gas bill as $60.00 
44 
45 
46 
Red TR. p. 68; Green TR. p. 56; D. Ex. No. 29. 
P. Ex. No. 16. 
Red TR . p. 6 6 . 
-21-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
per month, and yet her very own exhibit (P. Ex. No. 34) reveals that she 
only spent an average of $22.54 per month on gas. Plaintiff estimated her 
monthly medical and dental expenses to be $50.00 and yet also added an 
additional $30.00 per month to pay for medical insurance. Obviously, 
plaintiff is trying to claim a double expense for precisely the same item, since 1 
her medical insurance should cover the bulk of her potential medical and dental 
bills. It is also very interesting to note that even though plaintiff does not hav;l 
a job to which she must drive to and from each day, she nevertheless budgeted 
$100.00 for gasoline and maintenance on her automobile. This is in sharp 
contrast to the $50.00 gas and maintenance expenses which she had estimated 
. 47 but six months prev10usly. Plaintiff was also extremely lavish with her 
48 
own individual expenses. In her latest listing of expenses, she budgeted 
$265.00 per month for such things as clothing, art and pottery classes, and 
entertainment. 
It is painfully obvious from the aforementioned discussion that plaintifi I 
is seeking to reap a windfall from her brief marital sojourn with defendant. I 
Defendant submits that plaintiff tried to be fairly reasonable in her first 
itemization of living expenses ($598 .00) but was totally unreasonable and 
avaricious in her second itemization ($842 .00). 
47 
48 
Furthermore, when evaluating plaintiff's needs, one must consider 
D. Ex. No. 29. 
P • Ex. No . 1 6 . 
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the fact that she is a relatively young, able-bodied woman who is trained 
and licensed as an expert medical technician. She should have absolutely 
no trouble whatsoever in obtaining gainful employment to supplement her 
alimony. The Utah cases have all taken this factor strongly into account 
in evaluating what the wife's potential needs are. 
B. Short Duration of Marriage. 
There are many Utah cases which forcefully establish that when the 
duration of a marriage is relatively short the plaintiff-wife is not entitled to 
a substantial award of alimony. For example, in Frank v. Frank, Supra, the 
husband brought an action for divorce but the trial court entered a decree 
of divorce for the defendant-wife on her counterclaim. The trial court awarded 
the wife alimony in the sum of $200.00 a month for three years. The wife 
appealed this alimony award contending that it was inequitable. The Supreme 
Court in rejecting appellant's contention held that the record including the 
fact of the short lived marriage supported the three year $200.00 a month 
alimony award. The court stated: 
"We think that the trial court arrived at an equitable 
conclusion in case of a very short lived marriage. The 
record indicates that on believable evidence the other 
party was in a very much different position financially 
before and after the fortunate or unfortunate walk to the 
alter." 
In the landmark decision of Pinion v. Pinion, Supra, the trial court granted 
the wife a divorce from her husband after four years of marriage. The court gave 
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her $55.00 a month alimony with no fixed cut-off period. The husband appealed 
contending that the trial court had abused its discretion. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the husband and reduced his alimony obligation to a lump sum payme 
of $2,000.00. In support of its holding, the court stated: 
"As a general rule a young couple, married a short time, 
who break up with no children, would call it a misadventure 
in matrimony, and unless the wife has suffered more than 
the ordinary wear and tear of matrimony, or stands by the 
divorce to lose substantial material benefits in economic 
status or loss of inheritance, no alimony ordinarily will 
be given. 
"As to the age when they part company. She is 44. That 
and the fact that she was married four years would ordinarily 
entitle her to a substantial portion of his property if the 
interruption of her former career by marriage left her 
materially worse off in opportunity as compared to where 
she might have been had it not been for the interruption, 
or the opportunity or ability for readjustment had materially 
suffered. Otherwise, four years out of one's life well 
supported, with a return to singleness, cannot necessarily 
be counted as a detriment." [Emphasis added] 
In the instant case, plaintiff cannot count her marriage to defendant as 
a detriment. She is not now materially worse off than she was prior to their 
marriage. On the contrary, she is in a much better financial position now 
considering the generous property award which the trial court granted her. 
Schuster v. Schuster, Supra, is a final case which bears consideratio:. 
In that case, the marriage duration was slightly less than four years. Both 
parties had children from prior spouses, but there was no issue born to their 
marriage. Both spouses were middle aged. The trial court granted the wife 6 . 
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divorce. However, she appealed seeking that her alimony award be increased 
to $95.00 per month. The court refused to do so, stating: 
"Considering, however, the comparatively short duration 
of the marriage and the probability that the plaintiff may 
be able to increase her independent income which, she 
testified, was reduced by reason of the marriage, we are 
of the opinion that the total amount of alimony should be 
fixed at the sum of $1,500.00, and when this amount has 
been paid the defendant should be relieved from payment of 
further sums of alimony. " 
C. Permanence of Award. 
Not only is the amount of the award excessive, but the permanent 
nature of said award makes it intolerable. One of the trial court's objectives 
in granting a divorce is the "eliminization or minimizing of frictions or 
difficulties in the future". DeRosa v. DeRosa, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 
(1968). Recognizing this as an objective, trial courts are usually loathe to 
grant permanent alimony awards, since such awards create continual friction 
and interaction between a former husband and wife. See, for example, 
Christensen v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 2 63, 444 P. 2d 511 (1968). In the 
instant case, plaintiff's award of permanent alimony can do nothing but ignite 
an already explosive situation. 
It is also very instructive to note that very few Utah cases have ever 
awarded permanent alimony. In almost all Utah cases the alimony award 
extends for a certain finite period, such as two or three years. Often when 
the trial court has attempted to indefinitely extend alimony, the Supreme Court 
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has shortened the period. Wilson v. Wilson, Supra; Pinion v. Pinion, Supr3; 
Porter v. Porter, Supra. 
D. Defendant's Suggested Remedy of Alimony Inequity. 
Defendant does not suggest that plaintiff be left without any alimony 
at all. Rather, defendant suggest that plaintiff be granted alimony in the 
sum of $65 0. 0 0 per month for a three-year period. Such an award would 
comport with the trial court's order of temporary support in this case, which 
was rendered on July 14, 1976. Pursuant to the provisions of that order, 
defendant was required to pay plaintiff the sum of $650.00 per month as 
temporary alimony. Such an amount is ample to provide for plaintiff's rather 
luxurious needs (P. Ex. No. 29). This is especially tru.e since plaintiff 
could use her share of the proceeds from the sale of the condominium to 
purchase a new residence outright. Thus, she would not be required to make 
any mortgage or rental payments. 
Three years should give plaintiff ample time to obtain gainful employme: 
and readjust her life to new circumstances. Moreover, plaintiff's children 
are already for the most part self-sufficient, and in three years they will 
undoubtedly be even more so. Therefore, defendant submits that a three-
year award of alimony at the sum of $6 50.00 per month is totally adequate 
to provide for plaintiff's needs and allow her to live at the standard of living 
to which she has become accustomed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the circumstances in this case, the total dollar value of 
plaintiff's property award and her permanent alimony award in the sum of 
$900. 00 per month are both extremely excessive. Had plaintiff and defendant 
been married for twenty-five or thirty years, had they had numerous children, 
had plaintiff been totally incapable of obtaining any gainful employment, had 
plaintiff contributed substantial assets to the marriage, and had defendant 
not adequately provided for the needs of his family during the tenure of the 
marriage; the situation presented by this case might be vastly different. 
However, none of those vital factors are present here. Plaintiff possessed 
practically no assets when she entered into her marriage with defendant. 
Everything which was acquired during the marriage was acquired solely as a 
result of defendant· s efforts. The marriage was of very short duration, lasting 
only six years and seven months. No children were born as a result of this 
marriage. Plaintiff never worked to help support the family, even though 
defendant suggested it on numerous occasions. Finally, defendant was a 
very generous provider to both Mrs. Wilson and her two children by a 
previous marriage. As a result thereof, both Mrs. Wilson and the children 
were able to acquire substantial and valuable personal property which otherwise 
they would not now possess. 
Defendant desires to be fair and wants to provide plaintiff with 
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the necessary means to accustom herself to a new life. It is submitted that 
plaintiff's suggestions -- sale of condominium with a division of the proceeds 
and reduction of alimony to $650.00 for three years -- will accomplish this 
purpose and yet will cure the glaring inequity which now burdens him as a 
result of the trial court's judgment. Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, 
defendant, therefore, respectfully requests that this court modify the trial 
court's decree and grant defendant relief as prayed. 
Dated this /? day of December, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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